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a b s t r a c t
Organic product search results on Google and Bing do not systematically include informa-
tion about seller characteristics (e.g., feedback ratings and prices). Consequently, it is often
assumed that a retailer’s organic traﬃc is driven by the prominence of its position in the
list of search results. We propose a novel measure of the prominence of a retailer’s name,
and show that it is also an important predictor of the organic traﬃc retailers enjoy from
product searches through Google and Bing. We also show that failure to account for the
prominence of retailers’ names—as well as the endogeneity of retailers’ positions in the list
of search results—signiﬁcantly inﬂates the estimated impact of screen position on organic
clicks.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Recent theoretical work by Arbatskaya (2007),
Armstrong et al. (2009), Armstrong and Zhou (2011)
emphasizes the role of prominence in consumer search
models. The key to these models is that consumers visit
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ers receive more clicks than their less prominent rivals.
Prominence in online markets is sometimes interpreted as
a ﬁrm’s screen position in listings of search results—and
for good reason: there is abundant evidence that position
is an important determinant of the clicks retailers receive
from searches at price comparison sites (e.g., Shopper.com
and Nextag.com), marketplaces (e.g., Amazon), and auction
sites (e.g., eBay).1 Of course, position is not the only
information included in search results on these platforms,
and it is well documented that this other information
about retailer attributes—reputational ratings, third-party
certiﬁcations, prices, shipping charges, and so on—is an1 See Ansari and Mela (2003), Ellison and Ellison (2009), Baye et al.
(2009), Brynjolfsson et al. (2010), and the studies cited therein. Addi-
tionally, Armstrong et al. (2009), De los Santos and Koulayev (2013), and
Novarese and Wilson (2012) summarize a number of studies in both on-
line and oﬄine environments (including the yellow pages, voting, and
academic citations) that ﬁnd that position signiﬁcantly impacts choice.
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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retailers receive through these platforms.2 Other things
equal, ﬁrms with more prominent positions do tend to get
more clicks—but other things equal, so do ﬁrms with more
prominent reputations and other characteristics relevant
to consumers.
In contrast to the rich information returned for searches
on these platforms, product searches on Google and Bing
return a list of organic results deemed “relevant” by the
search engine’s algorithm. Essentially, this is a list of re-
tailer names. Consequently, one can readily control for
a retailer’s position in the list of results, but not its
attributes. Effectively, non-position attributes that inﬂu-
ence clicks—reputational ratings, third-party certiﬁcations,
prices, shipping charges, and so on—are embodied in the
retailers’ names.
To be concrete, suppose consumers query Google or
Bing with the phrase “buy product X online” and that
an obscure website, say FlyByNight.com, is displayed in a
higher position than Amazon in the organic results. On
the one hand, FlyByNight has the more prominent posi-
tion, and based solely on this one might predict that con-
sumers will choose to click its link. This prediction, of
course, ignores the fact that Amazon has the more promi-
nent name (or equivalently in this context, is more promi-
nent in terms of its name recognition, brand awareness, or
brand equity). In general, one would expect both the re-
tailer’s position and name to inﬂuence clicks; a given re-
tailer may be less prominent in one of these dimensions
but more prominent in the other.
While little is known about how these factors impact
the organic clicks retailers receive as a result of product
searches on general search engines, recent evidence in-
dicates that sponsored links in more prominent positions
tend to have higher click-through rates.3 But there is also
evidence of what Jerath et al. (2011) call the position para-
dox: sponsored links appearing in less prominent positions
sometimes receive more clicks than those in more promi-
nent positions. The position paradox is consistent with our
view that factors other than position are embodied in a
retailer’s name and also inﬂuence the number of organic
clicks retailers enjoy following product searches. We wish
to test this hypothesis.
The main challenge, and the primary goal of this paper,
is to objectively measure the prominence of retailers’
names. This is a long-standing problem in economics and
marketing, and a variety of different methodologies have
been used. One approach, employed by Sappington and
Wernerfelt (1985) in their study of traditional liquor mar-
kets, uses historical advertising data to proxy the strength
of ﬁrms’ brand names. A related approach, pioneered by
Goldfarb et al. (2009) in their study of ready-to-eat break-2 See, for instance, Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001), Melnik and Alm
(2002), Houser and Wooders (2006), Jin and Kato (2006), Dewally and
Ederington (2006), Hossain and Morgan (2006), Baye and Morgan (2009),
and Baye et al. (2009).
3 See Ghose and Yang (2009), Rutz and Bucklin (2011), and Yao and
Mela (2011). Yao and Mela also ﬁnd higher click-through rates for adver-
tised products with greater objective brand quality (as deﬁned by exter-
nal consumer/expert ratings). As discussed below, our results are comple-
mentary to, and consistent with, these studies.fast cereal, uses time series advertising data in conjunction
with a structural model to obtain estimates of the value
of brand names. Unfortunately, these methodologies are
not ideal for measuring the prominence of online retailers’
names. Many online retailers are not publicly traded and
do not disclose advertising expenditures, and the parent
companies of publicly traded retailers do not systemati-
cally report disaggregated advertising expenditures at the
URL level. For these reasons, Drèze and Zufryden (2004)
use a third approach that relies on results from a con-
sumer survey to construct an index of the “visibility” of
100 online ﬁrms. As they note, this approach is expensive,
reﬂects visibility at a single point in time, and involves the
usual caveats regarding the use of survey data.
In Section 2 we introduce a novel measure of the
prominence of a ﬁrm’s name. This measure, which we con-
struct using comScore Search Planner data, is based on the
number of product searches at Google (or Bing) that in-
cludes the retailer’s name or URL in the search query. In-
tuitively, the inclusion of “amazon” as one of the terms in
a product search means, at a minimum, that the searcher
recognizes and can recall Amazon’s name. This may be due
to current or past advertising campaigns by Amazon, rec-
ommendations from friends, knowledge of Amazon’s prod-
uct breadth and depth, its speedy shipping practices, and
so on. This and other potentially relevant information is
embodied in Amazon’s name; retailers with more of these
“name searches” at a given point in time are deemed to
have more prominent names at that point in time than
retailers with fewer name searches. A revealed preference
argument indicates that this measure captures more than
mere recognition or recall. The inclusion of a retailer’s
name in a product search indicates that the retailer’s rep-
utation and attributes (in dimensions mattering to con-
sumers, such as product breadth or service quality) are suf-
ﬁciently strong that searchers ﬁnd it optimal to reveal—
through search queries—that results for that particular re-
tailer are most welcomed. We also provide evidence that
this measure works as advertised in an education context:
More prominent universities (based on 2012 U.S. News and
World Report rankings) enjoy more name searches than less
prominent universities.
In Section 3 we provide an empirical application of the
use of our measure of name prominence. The application
measures the effect of name prominence on traﬃc that
online retailers receive from organic product searches. Our
data includes approximately 12,000 product search terms
and phrases that led consumers to 757 different retail sites
in August, 2012. We employ data from a single month,
and aggregated up to the retailer level, to emphasize that
our approach does not require historical time-series or
consumer-level micro data. We present preliminary regres-
sion results suggesting that the prominence of retailers’
names and positions are both important determinants
of the links consumers click following product searches.
These results also reveal that failure to account for the
prominence of retailers’ names substantially inﬂates the
estimated effects of position. This suggests that companies
like FlyByNight that spend thousands of dollars on search
engine optimization—in an attempt to “game” their posi-
tions in search results—may be overestimating the beneﬁts
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results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of other
controls, and thus are unlikely to be an artifact of spurious
correlation.
Section 3 also tackles endogeneity issues inherent in
this line of research. Search engines have strong incentives
to provide searchers with relevant results. Consequently,
they base ﬁrms’ positions on results pages, in part, on
past clicks. In the above hypothetical, as more and more
searchers click Amazon, an optimizing search engine has
an incentive to demote FlyByNight’s position and elevate
Amazon toward the top of the list. Our analysis suggests
that when one controls for endogeneity, the prominence of
a retailer’s name is a more important determinant of clicks
than the prominence of its position. We ﬁnd that a retailer
moving from the median to the best positions gets about
80 percent more clicks, whereas moving from the median
to the best levels of name prominence increases clicks
by about 154 percent. In short, when one controls for
endogeneity, name and position prominence both remain
economically and statistically important determinants of
organic clicks, but name prominence appears to have the
larger impact. We also show that our main ﬁndings—that
name prominence is an important determinant of clicks,
and that failure to account for name prominence results
in inﬂated estimates of position effects—also holds for
Bing data. Finally, we show that these ﬁndings are also
robust to alternative measures of name as well as position
prominence.
Section 4 concludes with a discussion of the potential
relevance of our analysis for related research, and provides
some caveats and directions for future research.
2. Measuring name prominence
Consider an online retailer interested in attracting traf-
ﬁc to its website. It might invest in advertising through
traditional (TV, radio or print) or online channels in an at-
tempt to enhance consumer awareness and generate vis-
its to its website. It might spend large sums to build a
customer-centric website with a broad array of product of-
ferings and an eﬃcient network of distribution centers to
create customer loyalty and word-of-mouth (or word-of-
blog) advertising. Or it might use sponsored search, some
other strategy, or a blend of several strategies to induce
consumers to visit its website. A less costly option is to
eschew such investments altogether and simply “free ride”
on any traﬃc obtained through organic search results. The
levels of these and other investments by online retailers
impact the prominence of their names.
Unfortunately, measuring such investments is a chal-
lenge in online markets. As discussed in the introduction,4 Baye et al. (2014) provide an application of our measure of name
prominence to search engine optimization (SEO) and ﬁnd that brand eq-
uity has beneﬁcial direct and indirect effects on organic clicks and con-
clude that investments in brand equity should be part of a retailer’s
SEO strategy. Their analysis uses organic clicks at the search term-retailer
level, whereas in this paper we aggregate clicks to the retailer level. The
role of the application in this paper is to emphasize that prominence af-
fects consumer behavior at search engines, which can be accomplished at
a lower level of granularity.many online retailers are privately held and do not disclose
this information; publicly traded companies do not sys-
tematically provide detailed information about the many
investments they make to enhance the prominence of their
online arms. Our proposed measure of the prominence of
an online retailer’s name in a given period is the num-
ber of name searches it obtained during that period. Here,
name searches refers to search terms and phrases such as
“cameras amazon” and “amazon” that include the retailers
name or URL.
For a variety of reasons, the number of name searches
is a potentially useful measure of the prominence of a
retailer’s name. First, it is measurable. For example, one
can use comScore Search Planner or Google Trends data to
calculate the number of name searches different retailers
received in a given month. Second, the number of name
searches captures the aggregate behavior of individual
searchers who are acting on all of the many investments
retailers made up to that point in time. Essentially, a
ﬁrm’s number of name searches embodies the cumulative
branding efforts of the ﬁrm up to and including the instant
a search is made. Third, the number of name searches
in a given month takes into account the stock of name
prominence or the accumulated brand equity of retailers.
In contrast, even if data were available on the investments
different retailers made on advertising and other brand-
enhancing activities in a given month, such expenditures
merely represent ﬂows that incrementally change name
prominence relative to previous periods, and therefore
would not be helpful in conducting a cross-sectional anal-
ysis of the impact of name prominence on ﬁrms’ organic
clicks from product searches. Even with time-series data
on advertising and other brand-enhancing expenditures,
one would have to deal with the thorny issue of iden-
tifying the stock of brand equity from such ﬂow data.
Finally, a revealed preference argument indicates that the
total number of name searches conveniently embodies
branding, reputation and other attributes that shoppers
associate with a retailer’s name.
More formally, let A denote a set of alternative search
terms, let  denote an individual’s binary preference or-
dering, and S ≡ S(A, ) denote the search phrase actually
used by the individual (e.g., his or her choice of search
terms). By the weak axiom of revealed preference, S′ ∈
A implies SS’. To illustrate, note that S1 = {shop online},
S2 = {amazon}, and S3 = {flybynight} are among a plethora
of alternative search terms (e.g., A ) that an online shop-
per might use to identify a product, a seller, or both. Since
each Si ∈ A, the weak axiom of revealed preference indi-
cates (among other things) that S2 ∈ S(A, ) implies S2Si
for all i = 2 . For this reason, one may reasonably infer
that an individual using the search phrase S2 = {amazon}
prefers search results containing links to “amazon” over
results with links to alternative retailers. Presumably, the
name “amazon” embodies retailer attributes that this par-
ticular shopper prefers to the attributes he or she asso-
ciates with the names of alternative retailers.
Thus, the total number of times a retailer’s name is
used in online searches is an intuitively appealing measure
of name prominence that is strongly rooted in revealed
preference theory. Note that, unlike some applications of
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Fig. 1. Name searches and university rankings.
Table 1
University rank and name prominence.
Dependent variable: logarithm of university rank
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Name) −0.418 −0.562 −0.436 −0.543
(0.078)∗ (0.069)∗ (0.068)∗ (0.069)∗
Ln(Enrollment) 0.666 0.556
(0.108)∗ (0.146)∗
Public university 0.853 0.228
(0.148)∗ (0.176)
Constant 7.923 3.178 7.734 3.910
(0.777)∗ (0.928)∗ (0.683)∗ (1.177)∗
Observations 94 94 94 94
R2 0.17 0.46 0.37 0.46
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗denotes signiﬁcant at 5%.revealed preference, this measure of name prominence
does not assume that all searchers have identical prefer-
ences. Indeed, any heterogeneities in preferences will be
manifested (and thus accounted for) in differing counts for
searches with different names.
In order to examine the potential promise of our pro-
posed measure of name prominence, we obtained U.S.
News and World Report rankings of the top 100 universities
in 2012 and placed each university in one of ﬁve quintiles.
Thus, the most prominent universities (which include the
likes of Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, and the other usual
suspects) were in the top quintile; Indiana University (a
large public university) was in the 4th quintile. We then
used comScore Search Planner data (employing a method-
ology analogous to that described in the next section) to
determine the total number of name searches universities
in each quintile received during February 2012. As shown
in Fig. 1, more prominent universities (as measured by
the U.S. News and World Report Rankings) received more
name searches than less prominent universities. For exam-
ple, universities in the top 20 averaged over 80,000 name
searches, while those in the bottom 20 averaged around
22,000 name searches.
Importantly, this relationship holds even though the
underlying data includes name searches by those look-
ing for scientiﬁc studies (e.g., “harvard ﬂuoride study”) as
well as name searches by students merely wishing to lo-
gin to university email accounts (e.g., “purdue email lo-
gin”). Name searches are a good predictor of university
prominence despite the fact that less prominent universi-
ties tend to have more students conducting name searches
to merely login to various university accounts.
Table 1 presents results from simple regressions of the
logarithm of university rank (with 1 representing the best
and 100 the worst) on the logarithm of the number of
name searches (Name) and various controls. The negative
and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for ln (Name) inthe baseline speciﬁcation in column 1 is consistent with
the relationship displayed graphically in Fig. 1: More
prominent universities receive more name searches than
less prominent universities. The speciﬁcation in column 2
shows that this ﬁnding is robust to controlling for the size
of the university (the logarithm of enrollments). Indeed,
this speciﬁcation results in an even stronger, negative rela-
tion between the number of name searches and university
rank. This conclusion is also robust to the inclusion of
controls for whether the university is public or private. In
particular, the speciﬁcation in column 3 includes a dummy
variable that equals one if the university is a public insti-
tution (45 percent of the sample), while the speciﬁcation
in column 4 controls for both enrollments and whether
the school is public or private. In all speciﬁcations, there is
a statistically signiﬁcant and negative relationship between
the number of name searches and the rank of a university.
In summary, the regressions in Table 1 demonstrate that
the graphical results displayed in Fig. 1 are hardly the
result of spurious correlation between university rankings
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Fig. 2. Organic traﬃc from name searches and non-name searches.
Table 2
Selected search terms that led users from Google to Amazon in August,
2012.
Rank Search phrase # Organic clicks
1 amazon 10,282,361
2 amazon.com 1,447,802
3 www.amazon.com 267,650
4 amazon books 137,463
5 amazon prime 84,103
6 amazon seller central 75,942
7 amazon seller 73,208
8 amzon 60,396
9 amazon india 55,035
10 com 50,417
11 google 50,172
12 amazon .com 50,006
13 amazon publishing 47,558
14 amaozn 45,638
15 amazon kindle 44,994
16 amazon customer service 42,579
17 kindle 41,834
18 gone girl 40,566
19 aazon 38,905
20 ebay 38,687
30 cake pops 30,631
40 nendoroid 25,472
50 ncaa football 13 21,001
60 portable dvd player 17,096
70 fire extinguisher 15,154
80 bluetooth headset 12,515
90 amazon customer service number 11,283
100 skin tight 9,811
All Search Phrases 82,963,096
Notes: comScore Search Planner data from August 2012. Search phrases
are ranked by the total number of organic clicks on Google. Excludes
search phrases that comScore does not disclose for privacy reasons.and the size of enrollment or whether a school is public
or private.
To further illustrate the importance of name promi-
nence, we used comScore Search Planner data to obtain
some of the top search terms and phrases on Google that
led searchers to click on organic links directing them to
Amazon.com, along with the number organic clicks asso-
ciated with each term. Table 2 illustrates a striking fea-
ture: A very large proportion of organic traﬃc from search
engines to Amazon.com stems from name searches—terms
and phrases such as “amazon,” “amazon.com,” “amazon
books,” and “amazon kindle” —that searchers use as a sub-
stitute for directly navigating to the Amazon.com web-
site.5 In contrast, other searches (like “Panasonic TV” or
“buy jeans” ) result in a much smaller amount of organic
traﬃc from Google to Amazon. Fig. 2 shows that several
other retail sites also receive a substantial amount of traf-
ﬁc from organic name searches, and that some sites receive
a greater proportion of such traﬃc than Amazon.
For these reasons, we believe that the number of name
searches is a promising way to control for the prominence
of retailers’ names. Next, we provide an empirical illustra-
tion of the importance of the measure of name prominence
on traﬃc that online retailers receive from organic product
searches.
3. Empirical application
3.1. Data
Our analysis is based on three datasets. We assembled
two of these using data from third-party providers that
specialize in electronic commerce marketing data (com-5 In industry parlance, name searches are sometimes called “naviga-
tional searches.” We use “name search” to emphasize that these searches
contain the name or URL of a particular retailer or site.Score and Internet Retailer) and created the third dataset
using a web scraper written in Java.
The comScore dataset consists of monthly Search Plan-
ner data for August 2012. These data are based on the
online browsing activity of two million users in the U.S.
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entered at search engines (e.g., Google and Bing), along
with the number of organic clicks that different websites
received based on the results pages generated by each
search term.
The Internet Retailer dataset provides a list of the top
500 online retailers, along with the retail segment in
which each retailer operates (e.g., apparel and accessories,
housewares and home furnishings, computers and elec-
tronics, and so on). The data indicate whether the retailers
have a presence on Facebook or Twitter, the year in which
the retail site began its online operations, and whether the
ﬁrm is a web-only retailer (as is the case with Amazon) or
also has a brick-and-mortar presence (as is the case with
Walmart).
Since our goal is to examine product search on gen-
eral search engines, the ﬁrst step in our analysis was to
link the 500 retailers in the Internet Retailer data with the
comScore Search Planner data. In particular, we examined
the Search Planner data and identiﬁed all of the properties
owned by these 500 retailers that were tracked by com-
Score. Owing to the fact that some retailers own and op-
erate websites with different domain names, (e.g., Amazon
operates both the Amazon and Zappos sites; Sears oper-
ates the Sears site as well as a Kenmore and Kmart site),
we ended up with a sample of 757 retail sites.6
Next, we extracted the comScore Site Proﬁle for each of
these 757 retail websites. Each site proﬁle provides a list
of the search terms and phrases (for Google and Bing sep-
arately) that resulted in organic clicks from results pages
for that search term to a particular retail site. For each
search term or phrase, it also indicates the total number of
organic clicks each retail site received from results pages
on each search engine. For example, across the 757 retail
sites, comScore identiﬁed a total of 11,836 search terms
and phrases that led consumers from Google to one or
more of these 757 sites.7
As we showed in the previous section, a very large
proportion of the organic traﬃc to retailers stems from
name searches. It is hardly surprising that searches includ-
ing “amazon” in a Google search phrase result in clicks
on Amazon.com links on results pages. We are therefore
interested in explaining clicks stemming from searches
that are not name searches. For purposes of our analy-
sis, a name search is deﬁned as a search that includes
the retailer/site name and misspellings (e.g., “amazon,”
“www.amazon.com,” and “amzon.com”) as well as phrases
containing such terms (e.g., “buy camera at amazon.com”
or “buy tv at amzon”).8 An examination of the 11,8366 Data on the age, web-only status, and retail segments of these ad-
ditional URLs, as well as data missing in the Internet Retailer database,
were collected by hand using information from company websites, the
WHOIS database, and the Internet Archive. All of these URLs inherit the
social network status of the parent company, as reported in the Internet
Retailer database.
7 We ﬁrst cleaned the data to eliminate entries such as “∗∗∗” that com-
Score inserted for search terms that raised potential privacy concerns.
8 In the Appendix we show that our results are robust to a more nar-
row deﬁnition of a name search that includes site names (amazon.com)
and misspellings (amazn.com) but excludes phrases with such terms (“buy
camera at amazon.com”).search terms and phrases revealed that 7,518 were not
name searches. For each of the 757 websites, we com-
puted the number of organic clicks received from these
7,518 searches that were not name searches. Thus, when
we refer to clicks, we are referring to non-name organic
clicks—a retailer’s total number of organic clicks minus the
organic clicks it received from searches that included its
name (name searches).
The third dataset was obtained by capturing search re-
sults. We wrote a Java program that queried Google and
Bing in September 2012 to capture the positions of the
retailers in our sample on the ﬁrst ﬁve pages of results
for each of these 7,518 terms and phrases. As discussed in
more detail below, this permits us to control for the po-
sitions of different retailers on results pages for different
queries, as well as to construct controls for ads on results
pages that may inﬂuence searchers’ decisions to click on
organic links.
Our analysis is based on variables constructed from the
datasets described above; basic descriptive statistics are re-
ported in Table 3.
Clicks. Our dependent variable is ln (Clicksi). As dis-
cussed above, Clicksi represents the number of organic
clicks retailer i received from searches that did not include
retailer i’s name in the search. As shown in Table 3, retail
sites in our sample received an average of 272,000 of these
clicks through Google. There is substantial cross-sectional
variation, however.
Position. Based on the data obtained by querying the
Google and Bing search engines using the 7,518 non-name
search terms and phrases, we calculated the average screen
position for each of the 757 retailers in our sample.9 Based
on these average positions, we categorized the position
variables as follows. Sites that never appeared on the ﬁrst
ﬁve pages for this sample of search terms were placed in a
position category labeled “worst.” While we do not know
these sites’ actual average screen positions, we know these
sites had the worst positions of any sites in our sample.
Remaining retailers were assigned to position categories
associated with the quintile in which their average screen
position fell, ranked from “poor” for those retailers with
an average screen position that was in the lowest quin-
tile of those in which at least one screen position was ob-
served, to “best” for the retailers with an average screen
position in the highest quintile.10 Thus, our primary mea-
sure of screen position is a dummy variable that equals
one when a site’s average screen position is one of these
categories (and is zero otherwise).9 Observed positions ranged from 1 to 51. Since we only obtained data
for the ﬁrst ﬁve pages of search results, positions outside of this range are
not observed and assigned a value of 52.
10 The intermediate categories are “below median” (second lowest quin-
tile), “median” (middle quintile), and “above median” (next to highest
quintile). A retail site in the “below median” category has an average
screen position that was in the second lowest quintile of those in which
at least one screen position was observed, while a retail site in the “me-
dian” category has an average screen position that was in the middle
quintile of those in which at least one screen position was observed. The
“above median” category contains all those retail sites that have an aver-
age search results position that was in the next to highest quintile.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics (N = 757).
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Clicks on Google (thousands) 271.96 2648.99
First Page 24.43 141.65
Ads 18.32 87.81
Position on Google
Worst 0.20 0.40
Poor 0.16 0.37
Below median 0.16 0.37
Median 0.16 0.37
Above median 0.16 0.37
Best 0.16 0.37
Name on Google
Worst 0.32 0.47
Poor 0.14 0.34
Below median 0.14 0.34
Median 0.14 0.34
Above median 0.14 0.34
Best 0.13 0.34
Name on Bing
Worst 0.56 0.50
Poor 0.09 0.28
Below median 0.09 0.28
Median 0.09 0.28
Above median 0.09 0.28
Best 0.09 0.28
Social network presence 0.89 0.31
Site age 13.04 3.41
Web only retailer 0.35 0.48
Retail Segment
Apparel/accessories 0.28 0.45
Automotive parts/accessories 0.01 0.09
Books/music/video 0.03 0.18
Computers/electronics 0.08 0.27
Flowers/gifts 0.04 0.19
Food/drug 0.04 0.20
Hardware/home improvement 0.09 0.29
Health/beauty 0.04 0.19
Housewares/home furnishings 0.06 0.24
Jewelry 0.02 0.12
Mass merchant 0.07 0.26
Oﬃce supplies 0.02 0.14
Specialty/non-apparel 0.14 0.35
Sporting goods 0.07 0.26
Toys/hobbies 0.02 0.13
11 Similar to position categorization, the intermediate categories are “be-
low median” (second lowest quintile), “median” (middle quintile), and
“above median” (next to highest quintile). A retail site in the “below me-
dian” category has a number of name searches that is in the second low-
est quintile of observed name searches, while a retail site in the “median”
category has a number of name searches that is in the middle quintile of
observed name searches. The “above median” category contains all those
retail sites that have a number of name searches that is in the second
highest quintile of observed name searches.
12 Based on the Internet Retailer data, Peapod is the oldest online re-
tailer in our sample. We were initially suspicious of the 23 year age re-
ported by Internet Retailer, and subsequently visited Peapod’s website to
conduct an audit. According to its site, Peapod began taking orders in
1990; the orders “...were placed online, just not over the Internet. Pea-
pod would provide software to customers and even sell the modems cus-
tomers would need to dial in directly to Peapod.”First page. Some of our robustness checks use an alter-
native measure of position that represents the number of
times a retailer’s link appears on the ﬁrst page of Google
search results. As shown in Table 3, the average site ap-
pears on the ﬁrst page about 24 times, but the standard
deviation for this variable is substantial. Indeed, one re-
tail site appeared on the ﬁrst page for 3,306 of the search
terms in our sample.
Name. As discussed above, our control for the promi-
nence of a retailer’s name is its number of name searches,
and we create two measures: One is based on name
searches at Google and the other is based on name
searches at Bing. Unfortunately, comScore only records
searches for terms and phrases that exceed an unknown
threshold, and as a result, 32 percent of the retail sites on
Google and 56 percent of those on Bing had so few name
searches that comScore did not report them. Retail sites
in this category were coded as having the “worst” name
prominence. The remaining retailers—those in which the
number of name searches is observed—were categorizedinto ﬁve quintiles based on their total number of name
searches, ranked from “poor” (number of name searches is
in the lowest quintile of observed name searches) to “best”
(top quintile of observed name searches).11 Thus, our pri-
mary measure of name prominence is a dummy variable
that equals one when the site’s number of name searches
is in one of these categories (and zero otherwise).
Ads. In addition to displaying organic results, search
engines also display paid (or sponsored) results. Paid re-
sults are essentially advertisements that expose users to
the names of retailers, and sometimes contain other infor-
mation (such as shipping charges or feedback ratings) that
may impact a site’s organic clicks. Based on the data col-
lected by querying Google and Bing, we computed a vari-
able called Ads. This represents the number of times each
retailer’s ads were displayed on the ﬁrst page of search re-
sults. As shown in Table 3, the average number of ads a
retailer in our sample had on the ﬁrst page was about 18.
Again, there is considerable variation; some retailers had
no ads on the ﬁrst page, while one retailer had 1,716 ads
on the ﬁrst page.
Social network presence. Sites that have a presence on
Facebook or Twitter get additional exposure to potential
searchers, and this might affect a site’s organic clicks. For
each retail site, we created a dummy that equals 1 if its
parent company has a presence on Facebook or Twitter,
and zero otherwise. As shown in Table 3, 89 percent of
sites in our sample have a social network presence.
Site age. One might speculate that ﬁrms that have been
online for a longer period are better known or have had
more time to build customer-centric features into their
systems. These sorts of considerations are captured in Site
age. As shown in Table 3, retailer sites in our sample have
been around for an average of 13 years. The youngest site
in our sample is aged two, while the oldest retail site has
been around for 23 years.12
Web-only retailer. To control for potential differences in
organic clicks for pure-play online retailers (such as Ama-
zon) and online retailers that also have a brick-and-mortar
presence (such as Walmart), we constructed a dummy
variable that equals one if the retail site is web only and
zero otherwise. As shown in Table 3, 35 percent of the
retail sites in our sample do not have a brick-and-mortar
presence.
Retail segment ﬁxed effects. Finally, to control for sys-
tematic differences in organic clicks across different retail
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14 Notice that this coeﬃcient does not capture the impact of a relativesegments, each retail site was assigned to one of the 15
retail segments identiﬁed in the Internet Retailer dataset.
Table 3 shows these segments and the percentage of sites
in our data within each segment. All of our econometric
speciﬁcations include retail segment ﬁxed effects.
3.2. Baseline estimates
As noted above, one limitation of the Search Planner
data is that, for each search term or phrase, comScore
only records the number of searches when the number is
above an unspeciﬁed threshold. An unobserved number of
searches (or missing search term or phrase) does not mean
the site did not receive any traﬃc from a given search term
or phrase. It simply means that the number of searches
was below this threshold. Our methodology attempts to
mitigate this concern in two ways.
First, we use categories rather than levels to measure
name searches. Thus, while the actual number of name
searches is not observed for some sites, such sites nec-
essarily have fewer name searches than those for which
comScore does report the number of searches. So long as
sites within the “worst” name category do not have hetero-
geneous name prominence effects, the ability to observe
the number of name searches of these ﬁrms would not im-
pact our analysis. Similarly, our use of page position cate-
gories accounts for the fact that we do observe the actual
position of retailers appearing beyond page 5 of search re-
sults. Again, such ﬁrms are included in the “worst” position
category.
Second, we use quantile regressions to mitigate prob-
lems stemming from the fact that comScore does not
disclose the number of organic clicks stemming from
non-name searches when the number of clicks is below
an unspeciﬁed threshold, T. We initially explored two
extremes to account for this issue via OLS. In the ﬁrst, we
set T equal to the minimum number of clicks observed in
our sample for each search term or phrase and assumed
that sites with unobserved clicks received T − 1 clicks. In
the second, we assumed that sites with missing numbers
of clicks received only 1 click. Results based on these two
extremes were qualitatively similar—and similar to the re-
sults reported below—but the magnitude of the estimates
were sensitive to these two extremes. In contrast, the
results reported below, based on quantile regressions, are
robust to these two extremes.13
We consider speciﬁcations of the form
ln (Clicksi)
= a +
5∑
b=1
αbPositioni,b +
5∑
b=1
βbNamei,b + γ Xi + εi (1)
where Position and Name are dummy variables correspond-
ing to the categories of the position and name variables
discussed above, and X is a vector of other potential con-
trols, including retail segment ﬁxed effects. The omitted
categories are the “worst” position and “worst” name cat-
egories. The coeﬃcients for the position and name dum-13 The reported results assume each retailer received at least one or-
ganic click.mies have the usual interpretation: A ﬁrm moving from
position category b′ to position category b′′ experiences
a [exp (αb′′ − αb′ ) − 1] × 100 percentage change in organic
clicks, and likewise for the name category.
Baseline quantile regression results are presented in
Table 4. All speciﬁcations include retail segment ﬁxed
effects, so the only other control in speciﬁcation (1) is
Position. Consistent with the studies of other platforms
highlighted in the introduction, sites with better positions
on Google results pages obtain signiﬁcantly more organic
clicks than sites with inferior positions.
Speciﬁcation (2) adds controls for the prominence of re-
tailer names. Two aspects of this speciﬁcation are notewor-
thy. First, adding controls for name prominence reduces
the magnitude of the estimated position effects, although
all of the position coeﬃcients remain statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the 5 percent level. Second, while the impact of
name prominence on clicks is not perfectly monotonic in
this simple speciﬁcation, name prominence has a positive
and statistically signiﬁcant effect on clicks, and ﬁrms with
more prominent names get more organic clicks than ﬁrms
in the “worst” (the omitted) category. On balance, these re-
sults suggest that name prominence is a potentially impor-
tant determinant of clicks.
The third column adds controls for ads appearing on
the ﬁrst page of organic search results. Consistent with
Yang and Ghose (2010), the coeﬃcient is positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant.14 This is consistent with exposure to
ads increasing the prominence of the ﬁrm’s name or link,
or providing other information about retailer characteris-
tics that increases the ﬁrm’s organic clicks. Adding this
control, however, does little to the estimated effects of po-
sition and name prominence on organic clicks.
If the effects of name prominence identiﬁed in speciﬁ-
cations (2) and (3) were purely the result of omitted vari-
ables or spurious correlation with better measures of ﬁrms’
efforts to enhance brand awareness and clicks, the results
would not be robust to the inclusion of other controls.
Speciﬁcation (4) adds a control for whether retailers have
a social network presence. The coeﬃcient is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant, but does not materially change the
estimated effects of name prominence. Likewise, one might
speculate that site age is a useful proxy for the prominence
of retail sites, since sites that have been around longer are
more likely to be better known than newer sites. The re-
sults in column 5 indicate that this variable adds little ex-
planatory power over and above our primary measure of
name prominence, and in any event does not affect the
estimated effects of name prominence. Finally one might
worry that the previous results are driven by differences
between web-only and bricks-and-clicks retailers. Column
6 shows that the results are robust to these controls as
well.
These results suggest that the prominence of a site’s
name and position are both important determinants of theprice change, and therefore does not mean that organic and paid links are
“complements” in the usual economic sense. Establishing such a relation-
ship would require a natural experiment along the lines of Goldfarb and
Tucker (2011), who show that online and oﬄine ads are substitutes.
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Table 4
Baseline model.
Dependent variable: logarithm of clicks on Google
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Position on Google
Poor 1.544 1.213 1.077 1.034 0.992 1.092 1.409
(0.245)∗ (0.233)∗ (0.224)∗ (0.221)∗ (0.218)∗ (0.215)∗ (0.252)∗
Below median 2.490 2.111 1.927 2.068 2.000 2.009 2.434
(0.245)∗ (0.241)∗ (0.234)∗ (0.230)∗ (0.228)∗ (0.225)∗ (0.255)∗
Median 3.282 2.858 2.597 2.617 2.501 2.538 3.022
(0.244)∗ (0.257)∗ (0.257)∗ (0.254)∗ (0.251)∗ (0.248)∗ (0.272)∗
Above median 4.580 3.969 3.562 3.652 3.569 3.533 4.211
(0.246)∗ (0.283)∗ (0.290)∗ (0.287)∗ (0.285)∗ (0.281)∗ (0.294)∗
Best 5.762 4.892 4.276 4.266 4.184 4.059 5.076
(0.247)∗ (0.327)∗ (0.363)∗ (0.357)∗ (0.354)∗ (0.350)∗ (0.358)∗
Name on Google
Poor 0.578 0.444 0.423 0.450 0.568
(0.227)∗ (0.217)∗ (0.214)∗ (0.212)∗ (0.210)∗
Below median 0.781 0.643 0.743 0.670 0.828
(0.242)∗ (0.233)∗ (0.229)∗ (0.227)∗ (0.226)∗
Median 1.109 0.834 0.808 0.866 1.049
(0.254)∗ (0.246)∗ (0.242)∗ (0.240)∗ (0.242)∗
Above median 0.622 0.503 0.518 0.538 0.840
(0.290)∗ (0.278) (0.274) (0.271)∗ (0.274)∗
Best 1.357 1.244 1.103 1.218 1.660
(0.322)∗ (0.314)∗ (0.309)∗ (0.306)∗ (0.313)∗
ln(Ads on Google) 0.237 0.245 0.256 0.209 0.300
(0.072)∗ (0.071)∗ (0.070)∗ (0.069)∗ (0.080)∗
Social network presence 0.475 0.492 0.601 0.634
(0.212)∗ (0.210)∗ (0.208)∗ (0.247)∗
Site age 0.022 0.038 0.016
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023)
Web only retailer 0.437 0.140
(0.150)∗ (0.170)
Observations 757 757 757 757 757 757 757
Pseudo R2 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.42
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗denotes signiﬁcant at 5%. All speciﬁcations include a constant and retail segment ﬁxed effects.organic traﬃc retailers receive following product searches
on general search engines. Comparisons of the position ef-
fects in columns 1 and 2, as well as columns 6 and 7, re-
veal that failure to account for the prominence of a site’s
name results in inﬂated estimates of the position effects.
3.3. Endogeneity
Following much of the literature that examines the
impact of position and retailer characteristics on clicks
at other platforms, the baseline results discussed above
assume that the explanatory variables are not correlated
with the errors in Eq. (1). Recall that the dependent
variable in these regressions is the logarithm of non-name
organic clicks on Google, and the controls for Name, Posi-
tion, and Ads are based on name searches, positions and
sponsored ads on Google. One might reasonably worry
that these controls are correlated with the error term (or
errors) in the regression, which captures latent factors
inﬂuencing the organic clicks that retailers get through
product searches at Google.
As an initial matter, if one used total organic clicks at
Google (including organic clicks based on name searches)
as the dependent variable, it would hardly be surprising to
ﬁnd that the number of name searches at Google is posi-
tively related to a retailer’s total organic clicks. We avoid
this issue by using organic clicks stemming from non-name searches as the dependent variable. Despite this, one
might worry that factors that are unobserved and unre-
lated to name prominence, but inﬂuence name searches on
Google, might also impact organic clicks on Google. If this
is the case, our control for name prominence will be cor-
related with the error term in the regression, potentially
biasing the results.
The results reported below attempt to mitigate this
ﬁrst concern by using name searches at Bing rather than
Google to control for name prominence. Our earlier dis-
cussion of the merits of using name searches as a con-
trol for name prominence did not rely on the identity of
the search engine, so one would also expect the number
of name searches on Bing to be a useful summary statis-
tic for the prominence of a retailer’s name. For example, a
retailer running a TV advertising campaign would presum-
ably get more organic clicks on Google, as well as more
name searches on Bing. We may thus use name searches
on Bing rather than Google to control for factors inﬂu-
encing the prominence of retailer’s names. Given differ-
ences in the Google and Bing algorithms, and differences
in their populations of users, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that unobserved factors subsumed in the error of the
regression—but that inﬂuence organic clicks at Google—are
independent of name searches on Bing.
There are, of course, scenarios where this assump-
tion might not hold. For example, a power outage that
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15 Since (exp (1.723 − 1.135) − 1) × 100 is about 80 percent.
16 Since (exp (2.754 − 1.820) − 1) × 100 is about 154 percent.only impacts Amazon customers will adversely affect the
organic clicks it receives through Google, and also reduce
the number of name searches for Amazon on Bing. In this
case, the reduction in name searches on Bing is unrelated
to a change in name prominence, and name searches on
Bing will be correlated with the error in the regression.
Notice that the concern in this scenario is mitigated when
the analysis is based on aggregate data from a single
month and includes retail segment and web-only ﬁxed
effects.
A more serious concern, in our judgment, is the poten-
tial endogeneity of two of our other controls, Position and
Ads. First, consider Position. If ﬁrms’ positions on Google
are predetermined at the time consumers make their click
decisions, it would be unnecessary to adjust for endogene-
ity. One might argue this is true for our data, since we are
using cross-sectional data rather than a time series of data
to identify position effects. However, our data come from
an entire month and, in practice, search engines contin-
ually reﬁne and optimize their algorithms in an attempt
to present searchers with the most relevant organic re-
sults. From the standpoint of estimation, this means that
a site’s position in Google’s list of organic results depends
on its past clicks at Google. To further complicate mat-
ters, past organic clicks on Google depend on past po-
sitions on Google and past name prominence. In short,
there are good reasons to worry that our Google posi-
tion variable is correlated with the error in the regression
model.
A related worry is the potential endogeneity of Ads—
another control in our speciﬁcations. Search engines make
money when users click on ads, and thus Google has an in-
centive to take into account the likelihood that a retailer’s
ad will be clicked when deciding whether to display it
on the ﬁrst page of Google results. Again, this means that
Google’s decision to display a retailer’s ad depends on its
past clicks on Google. Thus, there is also reason to believe
that another variable in our analysis—Ads—may be endoge-
nous.
Our strategy for dealing with the potential endogeneity
of Position and Ads is to use information about position and
ads on Bing as instruments for position and ads on Google.
Since Google’s position and ad decisions are based on past
clicks at Google—not Bing—these instruments would seem
to satisfy the requirements of valid instruments. Again,
there are scenarios in which the validity of these in-
struments might fail. For instance, a demand shock for a
particular product—say, a tablet PC—might lead to more or-
ganic and paid clicks for retailers selling that product. This
would elevate their positions on both Google and Bing.
This shock might also lead to more name searches on both
Google and Bing for retailers selling tablet PCs. In this case,
the instruments will be correlated with the error in the re-
gression. This sort of concern is mitigated, however, if the
speciﬁcations include retail segment ﬁxed effects and esti-
mation is based on aggregate clicks (rather than product-
speciﬁc clicks), as well as data from a single month.
In summary, we address these three endogeneity
concerns by using name searches on Bing to control for
name prominence, and position and ads on Bing as instru-
ments for positions and ads on Google. For the reasonsdiscussed above, all speciﬁcations include retail segment
ﬁxed effects and we continue to identify effects using
cross-retailer variation in a single month. The standard
two-stage procedure is used to control for the endo-
geneity of Ads. For positions, we use a use a two-stage
ordered probit approach in order to facilitate comparisons
with the baseline results. We ﬁrst estimate an ordered
probit model using categorized positions on Google as
the dependent variable, with categorized positions on
Bing and the other exogenous covariates as explanatory
variables. We then use the predicted values from this
ﬁrst stage to create instrumented position categories,
which we use in place of the original position variables.
In the second stage, we estimate this equation using
OLS.
Results controlling for endogeneity are displayed in the
ﬁrst column of Table 5. Comparison of these results with
the most general speciﬁcation in the baseline model (col-
umn 6 of Table 4) reveals that the results are qualitatively
similar. Importantly, however, controlling for endogeneity
increases the quantitative importance of name prominence
relative to position prominence.
The results in Table 5 reveal that retailers with “poor”
average positions do not receive numbers clicks that are
statistically different from those with the “worst” positions
(the omitted category). However, sites with more promi-
nent screen positions get signiﬁcantly more clicks, in both
the economic and statistical sense. Other things equal, a
retailer moving from the “median” to the “best” screen po-
sition enjoys an 80 percent15 increase in organic clicks.
On balance, the position effects are in line with what one
would expect based on studies documenting the impact of
position on clicks at other platforms.
The ﬁrst column of Table 5 also shows that name
prominence remains an economically and statistically im-
portant determinant of clicks across all categories. Other
things equal, a ﬁrm that moves from the “median” level of
name prominence to the “best” obtains 154 percent more
clicks.16 In short, when one controls for endogeneity, name
prominence appears to have a greater impact on clicks
than position prominence.
The estimated impact of Ads on organic clicks in the
ﬁrst column of Table 5 is almost three times larger than
the corresponding estimates in the baseline model. Con-
trolling for endogeneity of Ads, a 1 percent increase in a
retailer’s ads on the ﬁrst page of Google increases organic
clicks by about 0.758 percent, other things equal. It is re-
assuring that our ﬁnding that ads actually enhance organic
clicks is consistent with results by Yang and Ghose (2010),
who use an entirely different methodology and primarily
focus on sponsored search.
The results in Table 5 indicate that retailers with a pres-
ence on a social network (Twitter or Facebook) get more
organic clicks, but the effect is not statistically signiﬁcant.
On the other hand, Site Age is statistically signiﬁcant: Re-
tailers with older sites tend to receive more clicks. At the
mean of the data, the implied elasticity of a ﬁrm’s organic
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Table 5
Speciﬁcations controlling for endogeneity.
Dependent variable: logarithm of clicks on Google
Variable (1) (2)
Two-stage Two-stage
ordered probit ordered probit
Position on Google
Poor −0.341
(0.350)
Below median 0.769
(0.300)∗
Median 1.135
(0.276)∗
Above median 1.473
(0.288)∗
Best 1.723
(0.296)∗
First page
Poor −0.182
(0.348)
Below median 0.158
(0.338)
Median 1.040
(0.277)∗
Above median 1.234
(0.260)∗
Best 1.932
(0.268)∗
Name on Bing
Poor 1.377 1.358
(0.205)∗ (0.207)∗
Below median 2.042 1.981
(0.224)∗ (0.234)∗
Median 1.820 1.835
(0.241)∗ (0.250)∗
Above median 2.146 2.223
(0.231)∗ (0.250)∗
Best 2.754 2.776
(0.308)∗ (0.310)∗
ln(Ads on Google) 0.758 0.736
(0.072)∗ (0.071)∗
Social network presence 0.180 0.180
(0.268) (0.275)
Site age 0.090 0.082
(0.028)∗ (0.028)∗
Web Only Retailer 0.490 0.450
(0.214)∗ (0.214)∗
Observations 757 757
Pseudo R2 0.51 0.52
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗denotes signiﬁcant at 5%. All
speciﬁcations include a constant and retail segment ﬁxed effects.clicks with respect to the age of its site is about 1.2.17 This
is consistent with retailers with older sites getting more
clicks because they have had time to work out kinks. But
it is also possible that this control is accounting for some
elements of name prominence that are not captured in our
measure.
Finally, notice that the coeﬃcient associated with
the web-only retailer control is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant; other things equal, web-only retailers enjoy
more organic clicks from product searches on Google
than bricks-and-clicks retailers. While we are unaware
of any other study that has examined this issue in the17 Since d ln(Clicks)
d(Site age)
(Site age) = (.090)(13.04), or about 1.2 .context of organic product search, studies based on much
earlier data from price comparison sites generally reach
the opposite conclusion. That is, during the early 2000s,
bricks-and-clicks retailers that listed products on price
comparison sites tended to get more clicks, other things
equal, than web-only retailers. Two factors may account
for the difference with our ﬁndings. First, during the early
to mid 2000s, many web-only retailers were unknown
entities, and consumers were leery of them. Thus, negative
web-only effects during the early 2000s are consistent
with web-only retailers having less prominent names dur-
ing that period. Since then, consumers have become much
more comfortable conducting transactions online, and
have amassed additional knowledge about the business
practices and reputations of online retailers—including
many of those in our sample of the top 757 online retail-
ers. We therefore do not ﬁnd it surprising that, based on
our more recent data, web-only retailers tend to receive
more organic clicks, other things equal. Indeed, the results
are consistent with the view that retailers specializing in
internet sales provide better online shopping experiences
than retailers attempting to operate in both online and
traditional markets.
3.4. Robustness
Before concluding, we brieﬂy summarize some addi-
tional robustness checks conducted during the course of
our analysis.
One might worry that our method of constructing po-
sition categories somehow masks the importance of being
included on the ﬁrst page of organic search results. And
despite our use of categories, one might worry that our
position measure is sensitive to the positions assigned to
retailers not appearing on the ﬁrst ﬁve pages of search re-
sults.
To address these concerns, we also report results based
on our alterative measure of position. Recall that our alter-
native measure, First page, represents the number of times
a given retailer appears on the ﬁrst page of organic search
results. Retail sites that do not appear on the ﬁrst page of
any of the search results were coded as having the “worst”
position. The remaining retail sites were again catego-
rized into ﬁve quintiles, ranked from “poor” to “best.” We
then used the used the instrumental variables approach
described above to control for endogeneity of First page
and Ads using position and advertising data from Bing as
instruments.
The second column of Table 5 shows the results. With
this alternative measure of position, notice that retailers
more frequently appearing on the ﬁrst page of organic
search results continue to receive signiﬁcantly more clicks
than those in less prominent positions. But more to the
point, our ﬁndings that sites with more prominent names
receive signiﬁcantly more organic clicks than less promi-
nent sites, and that name prominence has a larger impact
on clicks than position when one controls for endogeneity,
continue to hold when this alternative measure is used. Fi-
nally, note that using this alternative measure of position
does little to the estimated effects of the other controls in
Table 5.
M.R. Baye et al. / Information Economics and Policy 34 (2016) 44–57 55
Table 6
Baseline model.
Dependent variable: logarithm of clicks on Bing
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Position on Bing
Poor 6.178 5.752 5.752 5.530 5.147 4.412 5.073
(0.661)∗ (0.627)∗ (0.630)∗ (0.633)∗ (0.645)∗ (0.599)∗ (0.595)∗
Below median 7.346 6.274 6.252 5.959 5.699 5.025 5.823
(0.656)∗ (0.639)∗ (0.653)∗ (0.656)∗ (0.669)∗ (0.633)∗ (0.613)∗
Median 8.214 7.065 7.065 7.006 6.534 5.829 6.878
(0.658)∗ (0.652)∗ (0.674)∗ (0.676)∗ (0.689)∗ (0.653)∗ (0.628)∗
Above median 9.113 7.708 7.708 7.507 7.171 6.151 7.561
(0.658)∗ (0.681)∗ (0.732)∗ (0.737)∗ (0.752)∗ (0.719)∗ (0.678)∗
Best 11.012 8.608 8.608 8.393 7.954 7.150 8.888
(0.658)∗ (0.781)∗ (0.907)∗ (0.910)∗ (0.932)∗ (0.894)∗ (0.811)∗
Name on Bing
Poor 1.377 1.398 1.417 1.371 1.341
(0.718) (0.722) (0.725) (0.738) (0.701)
Below median 1.627 1.627 1.626 1.642 2.077
(0.742)∗ (0.746)∗ (0.749)∗ (0.763)∗ (0.735)∗
Median 2.204 2.204 2.210 2.228 2.658
(0.739)∗ (0.744)∗ (0.747)∗ (0.761)∗ (0.729)∗
Above median 2.031 2.031 2.048 2.130 2.385
(0.765)∗ (0.770)∗ (0.774)∗ (0.788)∗ (0.763)∗
Best 3.218 3.239 3.316 3.337 3.179
(0.852)∗ (0.877)∗ (0.881)∗ (0.897)∗ (0.884)∗
ln(Ads on Bing) 0.000 -0.020 -0.009 0.089 0.242
(0.257) (0.258) (0.263) (0.250) (0.245)
Social network presence 0.217 0.290 0.404 0.505
(0.627) (0.639) (0.608) (0.606)
Site age 0.058 0.028 0.037
(0.058) (0.057) (0.057)
Web only retailer 0.313 -0.710
(0.442) (0.422)
Observations 757 757 757 757 757 757 757
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.28
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗denotes signiﬁcant at 5%. All speciﬁcations include a constant and retail segment ﬁxed effects.We replicated all of the above analysis using an anal-
ogous dataset constructed for Bing. We then used the
methodology described above to estimate a model in
which the dependent variable is the logarithm of or-
ganic clicks on Bing. These results, which are presented
in Tables 6, 7 and 8, are consistent with the ﬁndings re-
ported in the text based on the data for Google. We note
that the Bing data are “thinner” than the Google data,
and thus some of the estimated coeﬃcients that were
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level with the Google data
are only signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level with these
data.
As an additional robustness check, we replicated our
analysis using a narrower deﬁnition of name searches
that only includes the name or URL of the site (e.g., ex-
cludes “buy camera at amazon” but includes “amazon.
com” and “amazon”). Under this deﬁnition, a name search
is purely a navigational search—consumers using this
query are merely attempting to navigate to a particular
ﬁrm’s site. As shown in Table 7, the results are simi-
lar to those based on the broader deﬁnition of a name
search.
4. Concluding remarks
There is considerable evidence that retailer charac-
teristics impact click-through rates at price comparisonsites, marketplaces, and auction sites. For product searches
at Google and Bing, these factors are essentially em-
bodied in retailers’ names. This paper has provided ev-
idence that name searches are a potentially useful way
of controlling for differences in the prominence of dif-
ferent retailers’ (and universities’) names. Our analysis
also suggests that failure to account for name promi-
nence results in inﬂated estimates of the impact of po-
sition on clicks. We believe that our results are of po-
tential interest to companies interested in search engine
optimization (see Baye et al. (2014)), as well as poli-
cymakers working on issues related to online product
search.
While we have focused on organic (or natural) clicks in
the present paper, our proposed measure of name promi-
nence is also potentially useful for controlling for fac-
tors other than position that inﬂuence clicks on spon-
sored (or paid) links. As noted in the introduction, some
researchers have constructed similar controls through ex-
pensive consumer surveys. While the present paper uti-
lizes a single month of data to demonstrate the poten-
tial utility of our measure, one can readily use the com-
Score data to construct time series measures of name
prominence. While the comScore data is not cheap, con-
structing an 18 month time series from these data is
far less expensive than conducting 18 monthly consumer
surveys.
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Table 7
Alternative measures of name recognition and position.
Dependent variable: logarithm of clicks on Bing
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Measure of name recognition
Phrase contains name Only name or
or domain of retailer domain of retailer
Position on Bing
Poor 2.681 4.291
(0.611)∗ (0.556)∗
Below median 2.988 4.174
(0.651)∗ (0.583)∗
Median 3.845 5.072
(0.679)∗ (0.619)∗
Above median 4.026 5.712
(0.768)∗ (0.702)∗
Best 5.433 6.889
(0.918)∗ (0.854)∗
First Page
Poor 1.274 1.529
(0.589)∗ (0.613)∗
Below median 1.696 1.703
(0.604)∗ (0.641)∗
Median 2.509 2.515
(0.748)∗ (0.731)∗
Above median 2.689 3.064
(0.752)∗ (0.824)∗
Best 4.074 4.236
(0.908)∗ (0.972)∗
Name on Google
Poor 3.182 4.154 1.920 4.140
(0.619)∗ (0.603)∗ (0.548)∗ (0.628)∗
Below median 4.336 5.807 2.960 5.466
(0.658)∗ (0.638)∗ (0.596)∗ (0.681)∗
Median 4.517 5.583 3.021 5.444
(0.697)∗ (0.685)∗ (0.626)∗ (0.722)∗
Above median 4.721 5.867 3.012 5.486
(0.767)∗ (0.750)∗ (0.699)∗ (0.815)∗
Best 5.007 6.136 3.368 5.775
(0.899)∗ (0.891)∗ (0.838)∗ (0.970)∗
ln(Ads on Bing) 0.039 0.180 0.189 0.296
(0.257) (0.249) (0.215) (0.248)
Social network presence 0.508 0.654 0.362 0.500
(0.614) (0.600) (0.541) (0.625)
Site age 0.051 0.047 0.049 0.053
(0.057) (0.056) (0.051) (0.058)
Web only retailer 0.132 0.153 0.079 0.074
(0.451) (0.439) (0.395) (0.454)
Observations 757 757 757 757
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.33
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗denotes signiﬁcant at 5%. All speciﬁcations include a constant and retail segment ﬁxed effects.
the area.We used comScore data in order to mitigate long-tail
issues, and thus to offer results based on the largest pos-
sible cross-section of retailers and search terms. We note
that it is also possible to measure name searches (for a
more limited number of ﬁrms and search terms) using
Google Trends, which is free. For this reason, the measure
of name prominence introduced in this paper is a read-
ily available and potentially powerful way of controlling
for name prominence in environments unrelated to organic
search.
In conclusion, note that we utilized across-retailer vari-
ation and reduced-form quantile regressions on data from
a single month to demonstrate that this measure requiresneither detailed micro or time-series data nor strong struc-
tural assumptions. Our rationale for using bins and quan-
tile regressions to deal with long-tail issues is that this ap-
proach is “minimalist” in terms of the number of extrane-
ous structural assumptions needed to conduct the analy-
sis. While this is appropriate for demonstrating the poten-
tial utility of our proposed measure, more detailed model-
ing of the long tail—including structural modeling of con-
sumer choice at the level of search terms—is required be-
fore more deﬁnitive estimates of the relative returns on in-
vestments in name prominence and position prominence
can be made. This is the direction of our future work in
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Table 8
Speciﬁcations controlling for endogeneity.
Dependent variable: logarithm of clicks on Bing
Variable (1) (2)
Two-stage Two-stage
ordered probit ordered probit
Position on Bing
Poor −0.111
(0.414)
Below median −0.920
(0.421)∗
Median 0.607
(0.433)
Above median 0.606
(0.376)
Best 0.700
(0.393)
First Page
Poor −0.958
(0.270)∗
Below median −1.390
(0.325)∗
Median −0.071
(0.218)
Above median 0.172
(0.206)
Best 0.016
(0.242)
Name on Google
Poor 1.737 1.640
(0.429)∗ (0.278)∗
Below median 3.481 2.223
(0.405)∗ (0.287)∗
Median 3.867 2.778
(0.408)∗ (0.269)∗
Above median 4.918 3.495
(0.406)∗ (0.265)∗
Best 5.622 4.240
(0.448)∗ (0.322)∗
ln(Ads on Bing) 0.543 0.524
(0.134)∗ (0.076)∗
Social network oresence 0.557 0.614
(0.362) (0.287)∗
Site age 0.081 0.066
(0.036)∗ (0.026)∗
Web only retailer 0.335 0.719
(0.281) (0.208)∗
Observations 757 757
PseudoR2 0.47 0.52
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗denotes signiﬁcant at 5%. All
speciﬁcations include a constant and retail segment ﬁxed effects.References
Ansari, A., Mela, C., 2003. E-customization. J. Mark. Res. 40 (2), 131–146.
Arbatskaya, M., 2007. Ordered search. RAND J. Econ. 38 (1), 119–126.
Armstrong, M., Vickers, J., Zhou, J., 2009. Prominence and consumer
search. RAND J. Econ. 40 (2), 209–233.
Armstrong, M., Zhou, J., 2011. Paying for prominence. Econ. J. 121 (556),
F368–F395.
Baye, M.R., Morgan, J., 2009. Brand and price advertising in online mar-
kets. Manag. Science 55 (7), 1139–1151.
Baye, M.R., Gatti, R.J.R., Kattuman, P., Morgan, J., 2009. Clicks, discontinu-
ities, and ﬁrm demand online. J. Econ. Manag. Strateg. 18, 935–975.
Baye, M. R., De los Santos, B., Wildenbeest, M. R., 2014. Search engine
optimization: what drives organic traﬃc to retail sites?” Kelley School
of Business Research Paper No. 2014-2047.
Brynjolfsson, E., Dick, A., Smith, M.D., 2010. A nearly perfect market?
Quant. Mark. Econ. 8 (1), 1–33.
De los Santos, B., Koulayev, S., 2013. Optimizing click-through in online
rankings for partially anonymous consumers. Working paper.
Dewally, M., Ederington, L., 2006. Reputation, certiﬁcation, warranties, and
information as remedies for seller-buyer information asymmetries:
Lessons from the online comic book market. J. Bus. 79 (2), 693–729.
Drèze, X., Zufryden, F., 2004. Measurement of online visibility and its im-
pact on internet traﬃc. J. Interact. Mark. 18 (1), 20–37.
Ellison, G., Ellison, S.F., 2009. Search, obfuscation and price elasticities on
the internet. Econometrica 77 (2), 427–452.
Ghose, A., Yang, S., 2009. An empirical analysis of search engine adver-
tising: Sponsored search in electronic markets. Manag. Sci. 55 (10),
1605–1622.
Goldfarb, A., Tucker, C., 2011. Search engine advertising: Channel substitu-
tion when pricing Ads to context. Manag. Sci. 57 (3), 458–470.
Goldfarb, A., Lu, Q., Moorthy, S., 2009. Measuring brand value in an equi-
librium framework. Manag. Sci. 28 (1), 69–86.
Hossain, T., Morgan, J., 2006. Plus shipping and handling: Revenue (non)
equivalence in ﬁeld experiments on ebay. BE J. Econ. Anal. Policy 6
(2).
Houser, D., Wooders, J., 2006. Reputation in auctions: Theory, and evi-
dence from ebay. J. Econ. Manag. Strateg. 15 (2), 353–369.
Jerath, K., Ma, L., Park, Y., Srinivasan, K., 2011. A ‘position paradox’ in spon-
sored search auctions. Mark. Sci. 30 (4), 612–627.
Jin, G.Z., Kato, A., 2006. Price, quality, and reputation: Evidence from an
online ﬁeld experiment. RAND J. Econ. 37 (4), 983–1005.
Melnik, M.I., Alm, J., 2002. Does a seller’s ecommerce reputation matter?
evidence from ebay auctions. J.Ind. Econ. 50 (3), 337–349.
Novarese, M., Wilson, C. M., 2012. Being in the right place: a natural ﬁeld
experiment on list position and consumer choice, Working paper.
Rutz, O.J., Bucklin, R.E., 2011. From generic to branded: A model of
spillover dynamics in paid search advertising. J. Mark. Res. 48 (1), 87–
102.
Sappington, D.E.M., Wernerfelt, B., 1985. To brand or not to brand? a the-
oretical and empirical question. J. Bus. 58 (3), 279–293.
Smith, M.D., Brynjolfsson, E., 2001. Consumer decision-making at an in-
ternet shopbot: Brand still matters. J. Ind. Econ. 49 (4), 541–558.
Yang, S., Ghose, A., 2010. Analyzing the relationship between organic and
sponsored search advertising: Positive, negative, or zero interdepen-
dence? Mark. Sci. 29 (4), 602–623.
Yao, S., Mela, C.F., 2011. A dynamic model of sponsored search advertising.
Mark. Sci. 30 (3), 447–468.
